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The Effect of Money Supply and Government Expenditure Shock  
in Indonesia: Symmetric or Asymmetric? 
 
 
I. Introduction: 
 
The economic crisis in Indonesia has taken place for more than 4 years. While other 
Asian countries such as South Korea and Malaysia have shown significant improvement, 
Indonesia seems to have the slowest economic recovery process. Table 1 shows the 
relatively poor economic recovery performance of Indonesia and that the growth rate has 
not been restored to the pre-crisis level. Other indicators such as exchange rate - which is 
still very volatile - also give the same conclusion. 
 
Table 1: 
ECONOMIC GROTWH THE SEVEN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES AND SEVERAL ASIAN COUNTRIES
(PERCENT PER ANNUM)
Group of Countries 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Qrt.3 Qrt.4 Qrt.1 Qrt.2 Qrt.3
Seven Major Industrial Countries
United States 2.60        3.40        3.40        3.20        4.20        5.30        3.50        2.50        1.20        0.80        
Japan 3.10        1.70        (1.30)       0.70        1.50        0.50        2.80        (0.20)       (0.70)       ...
Germany 0.50        1.20        2.10        1.50        2.90        2.80        1.90        1.60        0.60        ...
United Kingdom 2.20        3.10        2.90        2.90        2.50        2.90        2.40        2.70        2.30        2.20        
Italy 1.00        1.80        1.70        2.10        3.00        2.40        2.70        2.40        2.10        ...
France 0.60        1.50        2.90        2.70        2.80        3.00        2.80        2.70        2.30        ...
Canada 0.40        3.30        2.40        3.70        3.70        5.00        4.00        2.60        2.10        ...
N I Es
Korea Republic of 7.10        5.50        (7.00)       10.90      8.80        9.20        4.60        3.70        2.70        ...
Hongkong 4.60        5.30        (5.00)       3.10        10.50      10.40      6.80        2.50        0.50        ...
Taiwan 5.70        6.90        4.00        5.40        6.00        6.60        4.10        1.10        (2.40)       ...
Singapore 6.90        7.80        1.30        5.90        9.90        10.40      10.50      4.50        (0.90)       (5.60)       
A S E A N
Indonesia  1) 7.80        4.70        (13.10)     1.00        4.80        5.10        5.20        3.20        3.50        ...
Malaysia 10.00      7.30        (7.40)       5.80        8.50        7.70        6.50        3.10        0.50        ...
Thailand 5.90        (1.40)       (10.80)     4.20        4.30        2.60        3.10        1.80        1.90        ...
Philippine 5.80        5.20        (0.60)      3.30      3.90      4.80      3.60      2.50       3.30        ...
1) Based on 1993 Constant Price
Source : Indonesian Economic and Financial Statistic (Several Editions), Central Bank of Indonesia
2000 2001
 
 
In order to deal with the economic crisis, the government has imposed several policies, 
both monetary and fiscal. Government spending, which is one of the fiscal policies used 
in the Keynesian model, has not yielded a significant improvement in aggregate demand. 
As can be seen in Table 2.a, nominal government expenditure has continuously risen by a 
significant amount since the crisis hit Indonesia in 1997. However, the amount of 
government expenditure decreased in real terms due to very high inflation (Table 2.b). 
 
Theoretically, using only expansionary fiscal policy (i.e., increase in government 
expenditure) to stimulate the economy would create a crowding-out effect. The 
government also imposed an expansionary monetary policy after the exchange rate for 
domestic currency stabilized in the first semester of 1998. The money supply and interest 
rates are two indicators that can be used to reflect the monetary policy imposed by the 
central bank. Interest rates have been much lower compared to the 1998 level. The 
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Central Bank discount rate – SBI -  (one month maturity) which achieved 70,81 percent 
in 1998 has gradually decreased until it reached its minimum rate in April 2000 of 11 
percent, but then started to rise again until November 2001 to 17.6 percent. The reaction 
of the economy to monetary policy is not different from the reaction to fiscal policy. 
Even though the interest rate has been much lower than in 1998, investment spending has 
not been restored.  
 
Table 2.a: GDP Indonesia By Expenditure at Current Price
Expenditure 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
HH CONSUMPTION 183,530.5 219,565.0 261,544.5 331,586.1 388,722.3 663,459.6 811,207.9 867,997.10
GOV CONSUMPTION 29,756.7 31,014.0 36,575.6 40,299.2 42,952.0 54,415.9 72,631.3 90,779.70
INVESTMENT 86,667.3 105,380.6 131,182.3 157,652.7 177,700.4 221,363.8 237,359.4 313,915.20
CHANGE IN STOCK 22,908.1 18,696.3 19,529.4 6,371.5 17,859.7 221,363.8 -90,662.7 -83,319.20
EXPORT 85,296.2 99,437.5 117,696.6 137,533.3 174,871.3 506,244.8 390,560.1 497,518.90
IMPORT 78,383.0 91,873.8 114,147.5 140,812.0 176,599.8 413,058.1 301,654.1 396,207.50
GDP 329,775.8 382,219.6 352,380.9 532,630.8 625,505.9 1,002,333.1 1,119,442.0 1,290,684.30
* First Three Quarter
Source: Central Bank of Indonesia
 
 
Table 2.b: GDP INDONESIA BY EXPENDITURE AT CONSTANT 1993 MARKET PRICE
BILLIONS OF RUPIAH
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001*
HH CONSUMPTION 183,530.5 200,445.1 215,797.9 259,719.2 273,917.4 267,912.7 267,746.5 281,957.4 222,684.00
GOV CONSUMPTION 29,756.7 30,442.6 31,476.0 31,681.4 31,700.8 26,827.9 27,014.3 28,767.8 22,828.00
INVESTMENT 86,667.3 98,589.0 114,022.1 128,698.6 139,724.8 90,070.8 74,941.6 88,984.5 69,018.10
CHANGE IN STOCK 22,908.1 19,612.0 23,434.8 3,791.1 7,390.7 -11,066.3 -5,228.2 -16,138.3 -17,835.70
EXPORT 85,296.2 95,303.7 102,974.8 112,391.4 121,157.9 134,707.2 92,123.6 106,917.5 90,907.00
IMPORT 78,383.0 89,751.6 103,937.8 121,862.8 139,796.1 132,400.7 78,546.4 92,822.6 80,057.60
GDP 329,775.8 354,640.8 383,767.8 414,418.9 434,095.5 376,051.6 378,051.4 397,666.2 307,543.80
* First Three Quarter
Source: Central Bank of Indonesia
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Graph 1: Quarterly GDP of Indonesia 1993 - 2000 (based on 1993 Constant Price)
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Source: Processed by author using the data from Central Bank of Indonesia 
 
 
The economic crisis in Indonesia is intertwined with a political crisis, which makes the 
recovery process more difficult. It is rational that economic recovery is highly correlated 
with and must be supported by political stability. However, this high correlation causes 
most Indonesians (including the economic observers) to instantly blame political factors 
for the negative movement of economic indicators. Slow economic recovery is believed 
to be the result of the political crisis. 
 
Looking at the slow economic recovery and ignoring the political crisis for a moment, we 
encounter a big question: Is there a possibility of an asymmetric effect of monetary and 
fiscal policy on economic activity? If it does exist in Indonesian economy, then we 
cannot blame the slow economic recovery only on a political crisis. Besides, knowing the 
existence of an asymmetric effect is very important. From the policy point of view, 
failure to allow for asymmetric effects on output might result in the erroneous conclusion 
that distinguishing between anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy is unimportant 
(Chu, 1997).  
 
There are two objectives to be achieved in this paper. First, determining the existence of 
an asymmetric reaction of output and inflation to government expenditures and the 
money supply. Second, finding the best policy to deal with the economic crisis, i.e., 
determining which policy generates a larger and quicker response to output. 
 
This paper is divided into five sections. Section I discusses the background and objectives 
of this paper. Section II contains an overview of government expenditures and the money 
supply in the pre-crisis year. The theoretical background and previous studies about 
asymmetry are discussed in section III. Section IV examines the methodology, which 
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contains data used in the estimation process.  Section V contains the analysis of the 
estimation from section V.  The conclusions and policy implications are included in 
section VI. 
 
II. Government Expenditure and Money Supply in Indonesia: An Overview 
 
We define fiscal policy as used in this paper as the amount of government spending by all 
levels of government, which is shown in the national account from the expenditure side. 
The revenue side of the government budget is also a part of fiscal policy. The revenue 
collected by the government depends on the tax rate and the tax base. Changing the tax 
rate in order to increase revenue collection will take considerable time, since it must be 
approved by the parliament and requires debate between government and parliament. If 
the changes in tax rates are realized, people will not consider it as a shock since they will 
already be prepared. Since our focus is the effect of unanticipated policy shock, we 
consider government expenditures as representative of the shock instead of government 
revenue.  
 
There are several policies that can be categorized as instruments in monetary policy. In 
this paper we use the M2 money supply as proxy for monetary policy. Since M2 is a 
more stable money supply measure (Case and Fair, 2001) it is expected that using the 
shock of M2 would give us a more sensitive impact on output - if it does exists – than the 
M11. 
 
II.a. Government Expenditure 
 
Graph 2 outlines the contribution of government spending in aggregate demand for the 
Indonesian economy. The share decreases over time, which matches economic theory. 
Starting in 1987, the share has reached a single digit (except for 1988), either in nominal 
or real terms (using 1993 constant prices). 
 
The revenue and expenditures of all levels of government for fiscal year 1994/1995 to 
1998/1999 are presented in table 3, as well as several other ratios in government financial 
operation2. We can see the considerable contribution of central government, either from 
the revenue side or from the expenditure side. The share of central government revenue 
from total consolidated government revenue always exceeds 90 percent; for the 
expenditure side its share is consistently above 78 percent. 
 
More than half of all government expenditures are allocated to routine expenditure. The 
share of routine expenditures gradually increased and reached its highest share in fiscal 
year 1997/1998. The reason for this significant increase is local currency depreciation, 
                                                 
1 We find that using M1 as indicator of money supply would produce the same result. Therefore in this 
paper we only present the output using M2 as money supply indicator. 
 
2 We cannot present all the data in the time range of observation (1980 – 1997) due to the data availability 
for local government financial operation.  
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which led to a huge increase in interest rates and principal debt payments and an increase 
in subsidy expenditures in the central government budget. 
Graph 2: Share of Government Expenditure on GDP
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Source: Processed by author using the data from Central Bureau of Statistics 
 
Table 3: Several Measures of Government Financial Operation 
 
  Fiscal Year 
  94/9595/96 96/97 97/98 98/99
Central Government      
Share of Revenue on Total Consolidated Revenue 94.05 93.20 93.53 94.36 96.84
Share of Expenditure on Total Consolidated Expenditure 81.62 80.27 78.82 81.88 89.43
Routine Expenditure Share on Central Government Expenditure 54.06 59.54 61.48 67.06 57.03
Development Expenditure Share on Central Government Expenditure 45.94 40.46 38.52 32.94 42.97
      
Local and Provincial Government      
Share of Revenue on Total Consolidated Revenue 5.95 6.80 6.47 5.64 3.16
Share of Expenditure on Total Consolidated Expenditure 18.38 19.73 21.18 18.12 10.57
Routine Expenditure Share on Total Local and Provincial Expenditure 54.01 53.77 58.67 60.15 65.52
Development Expenditure Share on Total Local and Provincial Expenditure 45.99 46.23 41.33 39.85 34.48
 
Source: Processed by author using the data from Central Bureau of Statistics 
  
II.b. Money Supply 
 
Graph 3 shows the ratio of the money supply (measured by M1 and M2) to quarterly 
GDP. The ratio of M2 to GDP shows a positive trend, while the ratio of M1 to GDP 
shows a relatively horizontal trend3. The ratio of M2 to GDP started to increase when the 
government abolished interest rate restriction in 1983. A further increase took place after 
                                                 
3 The ratio of M2 to GDP exceeds unity since we used quarterly GDP. If we use the annual GDP, the ratio 
would fall to around 0.5. 
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the government deregulated the banking sector in October 1988, which stimulated the 
establishment of new banks. 
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Graph 3: Ratio of M1 and M2 to GDP
 
Source: Processed by author using the data from Central Bank of Indonesia and Central Bureau of Statistics 
  
III. Theory: 
 
III.a. Previous studies investigating the existence of asymmetric effect 
 
The study of the asymmetric effects of a particular variable or policy has been conducted 
over a long period of time by scholars. Johnson in 1962 recognized that tight and easy 
monetary policy produces asymmetric effects on economic activity. Studies conducted by 
De Long and Summer (1988), Cover (1992), Morgan (1993) and Karras (1996) support 
the conclusion that a negative monetary shock (either a decrease in the money supply or 
an increase in interest rates) reduces output more than monetary expansion raises it. 
 
Garibaldi (1997) studied the asymmetric effects of monetary policy on job creation and 
destruction using cross-country data. He found that the effect of an increase in interest 
rate is immediately transferred into job destruction. Conversely, the effect of easing 
monetary policy produces a slow response in job creation, and in particular, does not 
result in a one-time increase in jobs as much as one-time decrease in jobs brought about 
by higher interest rate.  
 
Kandil (2000) studied the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on output using cross-
country data. Theoretically, exchange rate fluctuations determine aggregate demand 
through international trade (exports and imports) and aggregate output through the cost of 
imported goods. He found out that an unanticipated positive exchange rate shock (local 
currency devaluation) leads to output contraction due to the significant increase in price 
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inflation. In contrast, unanticipated appreciation does not restore output. It even decreases 
output, since net exports decrease in the demand channel, while on the other side, people 
are less willing to hold domestic currency, which contributes to price inflation. 
 
III.b. Factors that cause the asymmetric effect to exist 
 
Most of the microeconomic theory suggests that the reaction of individual behavior 
changes are symmetric - i.e. to the change in quantity demanded due to the change in the 
relative price of a certain good. This is not the case in macroeconomic theory. There are 
several factors that contribute to the existence of asymmetric effects of monetary and 
fiscal policy. The first source is price rigidity. Policy has an asymmetric effect if prices 
are less flexible downward than upward. In macroeconomic theory, this can happen when 
the aggregate supply curve is convex.  
 
This asymmetric reaction can also be explained using the menu cost approach. In an 
economy with a positive trend of inflation, a positive shock to firms generates a greater 
adjustment than a negative shock of the same size. Inflation causes the relative prices of 
the firm to change. If there is a positive shock, firms have to adjust their relative prices 
and it creates menu costs, which do not happen in presence of a negative shock. 
 
A shift in aggregate demand can also create an asymmetric effect due to price rigidity. If 
aggregate demand increases, output will not increase significantly since prices adjust 
quickly. 
 
Information can also be the source of an asymmetric effect. For instance, in a banking 
sector with a relatively high interest rate, banks would be less willing to lend money to 
risky borrowers. This behavior results in credit rationing and a fall in output in a way that 
does not have a counterpart during a period of easy lending policy (Jackman and Sutton, 
1982) 
 
 
III.c. The importance of recognizing the asymmetric effect for Indonesian economy 
 
If the asymmetric effect does take place in the Indonesian economy, then the government 
has to be more careful in implementing policy. For monetary policy, a negative shock 
(either a decrease in the money supply or an increase in interest rates) would cause a 
significant drop in output, while a positive shock could only result in a slight increase in 
output and could be time consuming. A negative shock in fiscal policy would reduce the 
output of the economy. Thus, the government would have to spend more money than the 
amount it has collected in order to restore output to the initial level. This is problem since 
Indonesia already has a high debt burden. 
 
IV. Methodology:  
 
The technique that has been developed in order to discern the presence of asymmetric 
effects of a policy is a partial equation model. The most well-known technique to 
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investigate the response of the economy if there were an asymmetric impact is TARCH 
(Threshold Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity). This technique was 
developed by Zaokian in 1990.  
 
However, in this paper, we are going to use an approach developed by Cover (1992) and 
refined by Kandil (2000) to find the asymmetric effect of exchange rate fluctuation. 
Using this approach we can distinguish the policies that have an asymmetric effect.  
 
The above models will estimate effect of the money supply, government expenditures, 
and exchange rates on two main macro indicators: output and the price level. Over time, 
real output fluctuates around its steady state in response to aggregate demand shocks, 
energy prices, the money supply and government expenditures. Shocks from each 
variable are assumed to be randomly distributed over time. To investigate the asymmetric 
effect, we assume that each variable is symmetrically distributed around its steady state 
value. A positive shock is defined when a value of a variable in a certain time exceeds its 
trend value, and conversely for the negative shock. 
 
IV.a. Data  
 
In this paper, quarterly data for Indonesian from 1980:1 –1997:4 is used. The reason for 
choosing this period is to neutralize the political factors which occurred beginning in 
1998. We expect the reaction of the Indonesian economy to these three factors to reflect 
the reaction to the fundamental economic variables and to not be influenced by political 
factors. 
 
The data are collected from the Central Bank of Indonesia (BI), Central Bureau of 
Statistics and Department of Finance, and Ministry of Mining and Energy. The output 
data used in this paper is based on 1993 constant prices; for the consumer price index 
(CPI) we use the same year as the benchmark (1993=100). For the price of energy, which 
will be used in the inflation estimation, we calculate the weighted average price for each 
type of oil. This data is collected from Ministry of Mining and Energy, and the monthly 
consumption data can only be obtained from 1997. The data available from 1980 are only 
annual data. Therefore we divided the consumption of each fuel type by a factor of four 
to estimate the quarterly consumption. In order to get the weighted price, we multiply the 
price of each fuel type with its share of total fuel consumption. 
 
IV.b. Estimation Process  
 
The first step is to find the steady state for output, inflation, the money supply, interest 
rates, government expenditures and exchange rates. This is done by using the Hodrick 
Prescott filter technique, a widely used smoothing parameter among macroeconomists. 
The formula of Hodrick Prescott Filter is as shown in the equation below, and it chooses 
the smoothed series ( ts ) by minimizing the variance of y around s. The penalty 
parameter (λ ), which controls the smoothness of ts series, takes a value of 1600 for 
quarterly data. 
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The results of the smoothed series are presented in graph 4 – 94.  
 
After obtaining the steady state of each variable, we then define the positive and negative 
shocks for government expenditures and the money supply.  The positive shock takes the 
value of the difference between actual government spending and its steady state value if it 
is positive; otherwise it takes the value of zero. The negative shock takes the value of the 
difference between actual government spending and its steady state value if it is negative; 
otherwise it takes the value of zero5. Since we expect the sign of negative shock to be 
negative on the dependent variable, we take its absolute value. For the exchange rate 
variable, positive shock refers to the depreciation of local currency against US dollar, 
while negative shock refers to appreciation. 
 
For the case of monetary policy, we choose the money supply as an indicator of monetary 
policy, instead of the interest rate. The reason behind this decision is that the interest rate 
in Indonesia was pegged by the central bank before 1983. Therefore, using the interest 
rate as a policy instrument in this research would limit the period of observation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Note that there is a weakness in estimation of steady state of GDP. Theoretically, its steady state value 
should reflect the potential output. Therefore, natural rate of unemployment should be considered in the 
calculation of potential (steady state of) GDP. However, the problem is that there is no data available for 
unemployment for quarterly data. 
 
5 The formula to define positive shock is [ ]ttmt mmabspos −−= )(2
1
 and negative shock is 
[ ]ttmt mmabsneg −= )(2
1
 
 11
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
GDP GDPTREND
Graph 4: Actual and Trend of Real GDP of Indonesia
Bi
llio
ns
 o
f R
up
ia
h
 
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
CPI CPITREND
Graph 5: Actual and Trend of CPI of Indonesia (1993=100)
 
 
 
 
 12
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
M2 M2TREND
Graph 6: Actual and Trend of Money Supply (M2) of Indonesia
Bi
llio
ns
 o
f R
up
ia
h
 
5
10
15
20
25
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
DRTREND1 DR
Graph 7: Actual and Trend of Short Run Interest Rateof Indonesia
%
 
 
 
 
 13
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
GOVN GOVNTREND
Graph 8: Actual and Trend of Nominal
Government Expenditure of Indonesia
Bi
llio
ns
 o
f R
up
ia
h
 
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
EXRATE EXRATETREND
Graph 9: Actual and Trend of Nominal Exchange Rate of Indonesia
(Against US Dollar)
R
up
ia
h/
U
S 
D
ol
la
r
 
 
 
 14
IV.b.i. Output Estimation 
 
In order to discern the output reaction, we conduct several regressions. There are two 
general types of regressions conducted in this paper. First is the estimation of the level 
form of the dependent variable. This type of regression gives us an indication that the 
asymmetric reaction does take place in Indonesian economy. However, one problem with 
this regression result is autocorrelation. Theoretically, the presence of autocorrelation will 
not cause the estimated parameter to be biased, but we cannot make an inference. The 
second type of regression uses the difference form of the dependent variable. The 
problem of autocorrelation is solved, but since the dependent variable takes the difference 
value, while the independent variables are in the same form with the first type of 
regression, we have to be careful in interpreting the result. 
 
In order to find evidence of an asymmetric effect, we first conduct a joint hypothesis for 
each shock (F test). That is, we want to discover whether the effect of positive shock 
from the current period to the lags included is jointly statistically significant in affecting 
output. The same procedure applies to negative shocks. After conducting an F Test for 
positive and negative shocks, we then test whether the magnitude of positive and negative 
shocks is statistically significant. Summary of regression results are presented in the 
appendix. 
 
The equations for each estimation are also presented in the appendix. The summary of 
result is presented in tables I and II. Running the regression from equation 1.a, gives us 
the result that the effect of government expenditures (GOVN), the money supply (M2) 
and exchange rates (EXRATE) are positive to the level of output (which means that the 
depreciation of local currency affects the level of output). However, note that this result is 
due to the existence of autocorrelation problem, since the Durbin-Watson Statistic is far 
below the best threshold (1.19 compared to 2). Running the regression in difference form 
(equation 1.b) changes the probability level (the independent variables become 
insignificant affecting the dependent variable), but on the other hand, this reduces the 
autocorrelation problem. 
 
Table III presents the estimation results for output in the logarithm form, while the table 
IV presents the estimation result for growth of output. From the statistical point of view, 
the result presented in table III is much better than in table IV. It is shown by Aikaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) that table III is lower than the results presented in table IV. 
The only variable that does not significantly influence output is government expenditures. 
According to the other results, only depreciation of exchange rate affects the growth of 
output. 
 
Running the regression from equation 3.a also generates a serious autocorrelation 
problem as shown by the low DW statistic value. Therefore, even though many of the 
variables seem to have a probability below 10 %, we cannot make any inferences due to 
type I errors. Running the regression from equation 3.b gives us better results, since the 
autocorrelation is not so severe as the previous regression. The only significant variable 
affecting output is negative shock of government expenditure (NEGGOV), but the 
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direction is not as we would expect. This unexpected sign is perhaps due to the low 
predictability of the model, shown by the low value of the adjusted R-square. 
 
Table V shows the result of output reaction in difference form (from equation 4.b). 
Autocorrelation is not a problem in this estimation, shown by the DW statistics near to 
the benchmark (2.14 compared to 2). The effect of positive shocks in government 
expenditures in the current period (POSGOV) is statistically significant in increasing 
output. Surprisingly, the sign of negative shock effect of government expenditure in the 
current period (NEGGOV) is positive for a change in output.  
 
Using AIC statistics, the lag structure in equation 4.b gives us the best response of output 
to the shock of changes in the money supply and government expenditures. In the next 
step, we compare the result of excluding exchange rate using the same lag structure as 
equation 4.b. The reason for this is that Indonesia imposed a managed floating regime 
until 1997. The regression result is presented in table VI. This regression provides us 
better statistics than table V (including the exchange rate variable). Using the joint 
hypothesis (F-test), we find that the shock of government expenditures has a positive 
effect on changes in output. The negative government expenditure shock is not 
statistically significant in reducing output (F-test for joint hypothesis is 0.818). If we 
conduct an asymmetric test, we would conclude that government expenditures in 
Indonesia have a positive asymmetric effect on output, i.e. a positive shock in 
government expenditure increases output while negative shock would not reduce output. 
If we sum up the coefficient of positive shock from government expenditures, we would 
get the multiplier effect from positive government expenditure shock. The value of this 
multiplier is 1.688191. 
 
IV.b.ii. CPI and Inflation Estimation 
 
The summary of CPI and inflation estimation results are presented table II. Table VII 
presents the inflation estimation from equation 5.b. From a statistical point of view, this 
result is very good since it produces a low AIC (-6.28) and a very good DW statistic 
(2.06). From this estimation we can conclude that the growth of government expenditures 
and the money supply do not have statistically significant effects on the inflation rate. 
The depreciation of the exchange rate has a statistically significant effect on inflation, as 
well as on the percentage change in oil price. 
 
Table VIII shows the result of inflation estimation, defines shock and uses no lags. Even 
though the DW statistic is close to 2 and the AIC is low, none of the variables used in the 
regression are statistically significant on the inflation rate. Table IX provides us the 
reaction inflation to shocks using two lags for each variable. From this table, only 
exchange rate and fuel price shock are statistically significant in affecting the inflation 
rate. 
 
V. Findings 
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V.a. Output estimation  
 
Using the Akaike Information Criterion to choose the best estimate, we would conclude 
that the output estimation  - with respect to the shock of government expenditures and the 
money supply  - presented in table VI is the best. From that regression, the effect of 
government expenditure is asymmetric; fortunately the effect of positive shock is larger 
than that of negative shock. This implies that if the government does not increase its 
expenditure in the next period, we do not have to worry about the output contraction. The 
effect of the money supply shock – either positive or negative - is not statistically 
significant to output. 
 
 
V.b. CPI and Inflation Estimation 
 
Using the Akaike Information Criterion to choose the best estimation, we can conclude 
that the results presented in table IX are the best estimate, since they give us the lowest 
value of AIC, which is –6.429. Changes in government expenditures and the money 
supply do not contribute significantly to the inflation level, while two important variables 
affecting the level of inflation are fuel price and exchange rate. The inflation estimation 
in this paper is far from perfect, but this result at least gives us an initial indication that 
inflation in Indonesia can be explained from a structural approach. 
 
V.c. Fiscal Policy in Crises Year 
 
As shown in table 2.a, nominal government expenditures rose significantly after the crisis 
hit Indonesia. However, the amount of government expenditures in real term (using 1993 
constant prices) decreased due to very high inflation. The share of government 
expenditures in GDP in the period of 1993 – 2001 ranges from 5.4 % to 10.4% in 
nominal terms, while in real terms ranges from 7.1 to 9.0 percent. The share in real terms 
is always bigger than in the nominal terms (except for during 1995), meaning that 
inflation for the other components of GDP is relatively high compared to government 
spending. 
 
The regression results presented in table VI conclude that a shock in government 
expenditures has a significant effect and that the effect is asymmetric (positive shock 
generates a larger effect on output than a negative shock does). The question then: Why 
there was no significant improvement in output given that government expenditure rose 
significantly during the crisis year? 
  
The explanation arises by looking into the details of the government budget. If we take a 
look at the government budget in the crisis period, there is a significant change in the 
spending composition. This happens in all levels of government. Graphs 10.a - 10.c 
present the composition government spending for central, provincial and local 
governments respectively, for the period of 1994/1995 to 1999/2000. The share of routine 
expenditures has an upward trend, and consequently the share of development 
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expenditure has a downward trend. In the local government, the share of routine 
expenditures is almost two thirds of its total expenditures (graph 10.c) 
 
Why did routine expenditures rise significantly during the crisis year? Before we answer 
this question, please note that due to the data availability, we can only analyze the central 
government budget. However, this is justifiable since the share of central government in 
the total consolidated government revenue and expenditure is considerably high (as 
explained in part II).  
 
The most important factor that caused routine expenditures to rise significantly during the 
crisis year was the exchange rate. Local currency depreciation caused the payment for 
foreign debt (principal and its interest) and subsidy expenditures to increase significantly. 
Subsidy expenditures rose considerably because of increases in fuel subsidy 
expenditures6. Therefore, it is not surprising that although there was a huge increase in 
government expenditures during the crisis years, this increase did not have any impact on 
output, since it mainly took place in the sector that did not increase the productive 
capability.  
 
                                                 
6 Fuel price in Indonesia is not based on market mechanism. Government set the price of fuel and the 
amount of subsidy depends on difference between the selling price and production cost. The selling price is 
in domestic currency, while 90 percent of production is calculated in foreign currency. 
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Graph 10.a: Composition of Central Government Expenditure 
1994/1995 - 1999/2000
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Graph 10.b: Composition of Provincial Government Expenditure 
1994/1995 - 1999/2000
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Graph 10.c: Composition of Local Government Expenditure 1994/1995 - 1999/2000
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Graph 11: Central Government Routine Evpenditure by Type 1994/1995 - 1999/2000
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VI. Conclusions and Policy Implication 
 
VI.a. Conclusions and Policy Implication 
 
From the above result, we can conclude that a shock in government expenditures has a 
significant effect on changes in output, and that the effect is asymmetric (positive shock 
has a larger impact than negative shock). If government expenditure is lower than the 
steady state value (in other words, a negative shock), it does not reduce output 
significantly. But if government expenditure is above the steady state value (a positive 
shock) it would generate a higher output, with a multiplier of 1.688191. This is not 
surprising, since we only considered one side of government operations7. 
 
One possible explanation as to why output did not respond to the increase in government 
expenditures is the change in the composition of spending. More than one half of total 
government spending was allocated to routine expenditures, such as fuel subsidy 
expenditures and payments to foreign debt and interest, and these did not increase the 
productive capacity.  
 
The findings above give us two policy implications. First, the government must reallocate 
its spending, i.e. allocate more to development expenditures which will increase the 
productive capacity. Second, since Indonesia currently has a huge debt burden, it is not 
necessary for the government to increase its expenditures, since the effect on output 
reduction is not statistically significant. Moreover, the increase in government 
expenditures is likely to be financed by new debt. Also, there is no guarantee that the 
government will spend efficiently, since corruption is still a big problem in Indonesia. 
 
For monetary policy, we conclude that a money supply shock does not have a statistically 
significant effect on output. This result suggests that monetary authority should not use a 
shock in money supply to boost output. In other words, the monetary authority should 
focus on its function in delivering a low level of inflation.  
 
In the inflation equation, it is important to stabilize the exchange rate. The effect of the 
exchange rate is statistically significant in affecting the inflation rate. The benefit of 
maintaining a stable exchange rate comes from its effect on domestic fuel prices. Since 
fuel prices in Indonesia are not based on market mechanisms and the subsidy depends on 
the level of exchange rates (since 90 percent of production cost is in foreign currency), 
the benefit of maintaining a stable exchange rate comes from two sources. First, it 
reduces the impact on inflation, and second, it reduces subsidy expenditures for the 
central government.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Note that if we include revenue in the estimation, we cannot consider the change in tax rate as a shock, 
since the process that enables people to prepare for the change in tax rate takes a long time. 
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VI.b Suggestion for Further Work  
 
For further work we suggest two points. First, in this paper, in order to find out the steady 
state for output, we use the Hodrick Prescott technique. Theoretically, the steady state 
value should reflect potential output. In order to estimate potential output, unemployment 
data is required. However, in this paper we cannot obtain quarterly data for 
unemployment. Therefore, we suggest that the unemployment data be taken into account 
in order to get a better estimation of potential output (the steady state value). Second, 
since fiscal policy also includes government revenues, it is better to use the net domestic 
impact approach on the analysis of government budget in further work. 
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Appendix I. 
 
Estimate Equations 
1.a   ttttt EXRATEMGOVNGDP εβββα ++++= 3210 2  
1.b   ttttt EXRATEMGOVNGDP εβββα +∆+∆+∆+=∆ 3210 2  
 
2.a   ttttt EXRATEMGOVNGDP εβββα ++++= )log()2log()log()log( 3210  
2.b  ttttt EXRATEMGOVNGDP εβββα +∆+∆+∆+=∆ )log()2log()log()log( 3210  
 
3.a
tttttttt NEGEXRPOSEXRNEGMPOSMNEGGOVPOSGOVGDP εββββββα +++++++= 6543210 22
3.b
tttttttt NEGEXRPOSEXRNEGMPOSMNEGGOVPOSGOVGDP εββββββα +++++++=∆ 6543210 22
 
4.a
+++++++= −−−− 26154231210 ttttttt NEGGOVNEGGOVNEGGOVPOSGOVPOSGOVPOSGOVGDP ββββββα
++++++ −−−− 2121111029187 22222 tttttt NEGMNEGMNEGGOVPOSMPOSMPOSM ββββββ  
ttttttt NEGEXRNEGEXRNEGEXRPOSEXRPOSEXRPOSEXR εββββββ ++++++ −−−− 2181171621511413
 
4.b 
+++++++=∆ −−−− 26154231210 ttttttt NEGGOVNEGGOVNEGGOVPOSGOVPOSGOVPOSGOVGDP ββββββα
++++++ −−−− 2121111029187 22222 tttttt NEGMNEGMNEGGOVPOSMPOSMPOSM ββββββ  
ttttttt NEGEXRNEGEXRNEGEXRPOSEXRPOSEXRPOSEXR εββββββ ++++++ −−−− 2181171621511413
 
5.a 
tttttt WOILPEXRATEMGOVNCPI εββββα 43210 2 ++++=  
5.b 
tttttt WOILPEXRATEMGOVNCPI εββββα loglog2logloglog 43210 ∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆
 
6.a 
ttttttttt WOILPNEGEXRPOSEXRNEGMPOSMNEGGOVPOSGOVCPI εβββββββα ++++++++= 76543210 22
6.b 
ttttttttt WOILPNEGEXRPOSEXRNEGMPOSMNEGGOVPOSGOVCPI εβββββββα ++++++++=∆ 76543210 22log
 
7.a 
+++++++= −−−− 26154231210 ttttttt NEGGOVNEGGOVNEGGOVPOSGOVPOSGOVPOSGOVCPI ββββββα
++++++ −−−− 2121111029187 22222 tttttt NEGMNEGMNEGGOVPOSMPOSMPOSM ββββββ  
++++++ −−−− 2181171621511413 tttttt NEGEXRNEGEXRNEGEXRPOSEXRPOSEXRPOSEXR ββββββ  
tttt WIOILPWOILPWOILP εβββ +++ −− 22112019  
 
7.b 
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+++++++=∆ −−−− 26154231210log ttttttt NEGGOVNEGGOVNEGGOVPOSGOVPOSGOVPOSGOVCPI ββββββα
++++++ −−−− 2121111029187 22222 tttttt NEGMNEGMNEGGOVPOSMPOSMPOSM ββββββ  
++++++ −−−− 2181171621511413 tttttt NEGEXRNEGEXRNEGEXRPOSEXRPOSEXRPOSEXR ββββββ  
tttt WIOILPWOILPWOILP εβββ +++ −− 22112019  
 
Definition: 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product (Billion of Rupiah) 
GOVN: Nominal Government Expenditure (Billion of Rupiah) 
M2: Money Supply (Billion of Rupiah) 
EXRRATE: Exchange Rate Rupiah Against US Dollar (Rupiah / US Dollar) 
WOILP: Weighted Oil Price (Rupiah) 
CPI: Consumer Price Index 
POS GOV: Positive Shock of Government Expenditure (Billion of Rupiah) 
NEGGOV: Negative Shock of Government Expenditure (Billion of Rupiah) 
POS M2: Positive Shock of Money Supply (Billion of Rupiah) 
NEGGOV: Negative Shock of Money Supply (Billion of Rupiah) 
POS EXR: Positive Shock of exchange rate / Depreciation (Rupiah 
NEGEXR: Negative Shock of Exchange rate / Appreciation (Rupiah) 
∆ : Difference Operator 
 25
Table I: Summary of Output Estimation 
LEVEL OF OUTPUT CHANGE OF OUTPUT 
Adj R2 0.988613 Adj R2 -0.00158 
DW 1.193757 DW 2.641285 
GDP = f (GOVN, M2, EXRATE) 
 
 
 
  AIC 18.36181
GOVN**(+), M2***(+), 
EXRATE***(+) 
 
 
 
D(GDP) = f(GOVN, M2,  
EXRATE) 
 
 
 AIC 18.23697  
Adj R2 0.98976 Adj R2 0.036566 
DW 1.358583 DW 2.55508 
LOG(GDP) = f [LOG(GOVN), LOG (M2),  
                     LOG(EXRATE)] 
 
 
 AIC -3.89496 
LOG(M2)***(+), 
LOG(EXRATE)***(+) 
 
 
 
 
D(LOG(GDP),1) = f [D(LOG(GOVN),1), 
D(LOG(M2),1), D(LOG(EXRATE),1)] 
 
 
 AIC -3.67159 
D(LOG(EXRATE),1)**(+) 
 
 
 
 
 
Adj R2 0.699699 Adj R2 0.083064 
DW 0.864837 DW 2.64289 
GDP = f (POSGOV, NEGGOV, 
POSM2, NEGM2, POSEXR, NEGEXR) 
 
 
 
 
AIC 
 
 
21.67329
 
 
POSGOV***(+), 
NEGGOV***(+),  
POSM2***(+), NEGM2***(+),
POSEXR**(-), NEGEXR***(-)
 
 
D(GDP,1) = f (POSGOV, NEGGOV, 
POSM2, NEGM2, POSEXR, NEGEXR) 
 
 
 
 
AIC 
 
 
18.18838 
 
 
NEGGOV***(+) 
 
 
 
 
 
Adj R2 0.903105 Adj R2 0.312797 
DW 0.847196 DW 2.146201 
GDP =  
f [POSGOV, POSGOV(-1), POSGOV(-2),  
NEGGOV, NEGGOV(-1), NEGGOV(-2), 
POSM2, POSM2(-1), POSM2(-2), 
NEGM2, NEGM2(-1), NEGM2(-2), 
POSEXR, POSEXR(-1), POSEXR(-2), 
NEGEXR, NEGEXR(-1), NEGEXR(-2)] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20.65151
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POSGOV***(+),  
POSGOV(-1)***(+), 
POSGOV(-2)***(+), 
NEGGOV***(+), 
NEGGOV(-1)**,(+), 
NEGGOV(-2)***(+), 
POSM2***(+), 
POSM2(-2)***(-) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D(GDP,1) = 
 f [POSGOV, POSGOV(-1), POSGOV(-2), 
NEGGOV, NEGGOV(-1), NEGGOV(-2), 
POSM2, POSM2(-1), POSM2(-2), 
NEGM2, NEGM2(-1), NEGM2(-2), 
POSEXR, POSEXR(-1), POSEXR(-2), 
NEGEXR, NEGEXR(-1), NEGEXR(-2)] 
 
D(GDP,1) = 
 f [POSGOV, POSGOV(-1), POSGOV(-2), 
NEGGOV, NEGGOV(-1), NEGGOV(-2), 
POSM2, POSM2(-1), POSM2(-2), 
NEGM2, NEGM2(-1), NEGM2(-2)] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AIC 
 
 
 
 
Adj R2 
 
DW 
AIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18.04860 
 
 
 
 
0.319564 
 
2.164109 
17.97775 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POSGOV***(+), 
NEGGOV**(+), 
NEGGOV(-2)*(-) 
Government Expenditure: 
Symmetric 
 
 
POSGOV***(+) 
POSGOV(-2) **(+) 
NEGGOV**(+) 
 
Government Expenditure: 
Asymmetric 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** indicate the variable is significant at 1% 
** indicate the variable is significant at 5% 
* indicate the variable is significant at 10% 
(+/-) indicate the effect on dependent variable 
 26
Table II: Summary of CPI and Inflation Estimation 
 
CPI INFLATION 
Adj R2 0.995796 Adj R2 0.567979 
DW 0.600252 DW 2.063679 
CPI = f (GOVN, M2, EXRATE, WOILP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
AIC 
 
 
 
 
 
4.197366
 
 
 
 
 
GOVN***(+), M2***(+), 
EXRATE***(+), WOILP***(+) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D(LOG(CPI),1) = f[DLOG(GOVN),1), 
D(LOG(M2)1),  DLOG(EXRATE),1), 
D(LOG(WOILP),1)] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AIC 
 
 
 
 
 
-6.281376 
 
 
 
 
 
D(LOG(EXRATE),1)***(+) 
D(LOG(WOILP),1)***(+) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adj R2 0.937247 Adj R2 0.005638 
DW 0.459535 DW 2.200933 
CPI = f (POSGOV, NEGGOV, 
POSM2, NEGM2, POSEXR, NEGEXR, 
WOILP) 
 
 
 
 
AIC 
 
 
 
 
6.938968
 
 
 
 
NEGGOV*(+),  
POSM2***(+),  
POSEXR**(-),  
NEGEXR***(-) 
WOILP***(+) 
 
 
 
D(LOG(CPI),1) =  
f (POSGOV, NEGGOV, 
POSM2, NEGM2, POSEXR, NEGEXR, 
WOILP) 
 
 
 
 
AIC 
 
 
 
 
-5.408802 
 
 
 
  
Adj R2 0.956799 Adj R2 0.587571 
DW 0.591417 DW 2.742616 
CPI =  
f [POSGOV, POSGOV(-1), POSGOV(-2),  
NEGGOV, NEGGOV(-1), NEGGOV(-2), 
POSM2, POSM2(-1), POSM2(-2), 
NEGM2, NEGM2(-1), NEGM2(-2), 
POSEXR, POSEXR(-1), POSEXR(-2), 
NEGEXR, NEGEXR(-1), NEGEXR(-2), 
WOILP, WOILP(-1), WOILP(-2)] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.684241
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEGGOV***(+), 
NEGGOV(-2)**(+), 
POSM2***(+) 
POSM2(-2)**(-) 
NEGM2(-2)**(+) 
WOILP**(+) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D(LOG(CPI),1) =  
f [POSGOV, POSGOV(-1), POSGOV(-2), 
NEGGOV, NEGGOV(-1), NEGGOV(-2), 
POSM2, POSM2(-1), POSM2(-2), 
NEGM2, NEGM2(-1), NEGM2(-2), 
POSEXR, POSEXR(-1), POSEXR(-2), 
NEGEXR, NEGEXR(-1), NEGEXR(-2), 
WOILP, WOILP(-1), WOILP(-2)] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-6.429508 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEGEXR**(-), 
NEGEXR(-1)**(+), 
WOILP***(+) 
WOILP(-1)***(-) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** indicate the variable is significant at 1% 
** indicate the variable is significant at 5% 
* indicate the variable is significant at 10% 
(+/-) indicate the effect on dependent variable 
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Table III: Output Estimation: Without Defining Positive and Negative Shock (in Log 
Form) 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(GDP) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/25/02   Time: 09:13 
Sample: 1980:1 1997:2 
Included observations: 70 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 7.491894 0.115726 64.73832 0.0000
LOG(GOVN) -0.002260 0.028135 -0.080329 0.9362
LOG(M2) 0.281845 0.019535 14.42794 0.0000
LOG(EXRATE) 0.070047 0.023894 2.931562 0.0046
R-squared 0.990206     Mean dependent var 11.01811
Adjusted R-squared 0.989760     S.D. dependent var 0.331742
S.E. of regression 0.033569     Akaike info criterion -3.894957
Sum squared resid 0.074376     Schwarz criterion -3.766472
Log likelihood 140.3235     F-statistic 2224.165
Durbin-Watson stat 1.358583     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
 
Table IV: Output Estimation: Without Defining Positive and Negative Shock (in 
Difference of log form / growth rate) 
 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(GDP),1) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/25/02   Time: 09:14 
Sample(adjusted): 1980:2 1997:2 
Included observations: 69 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.015047 0.009185 1.638257 0.1062
D(LOG(GOVN),1) -0.013038 0.023662 -0.551002 0.5835
D(LOG(M2),1) -0.043264 0.153460 -0.281923 0.7789
D(LOG(EXRATE),1) 0.208096 0.090212 2.306751 0.0243
R-squared 0.079071     Mean dependent var 0.016528
Adjusted R-squared 0.036566     S.D. dependent var 0.038227
S.E. of regression 0.037521     Akaike info criterion -3.671594
Sum squared resid 0.091510     Schwarz criterion -3.542081
Log likelihood 130.6700     F-statistic 1.860298
Durbin-Watson stat 2.555080     Prob(F-statistic) 0.145066
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Table V: Reaction of Output to Positive and Negative Shock With 2 Lags  
 
Dependent Variable: D(GDP,1) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/25/02   Time: 09:23 
Sample(adjusted): 1980:3 1997:2 
Included observations: 68 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 398.9398 631.5789 0.631655 0.5305
POSGOV*** 1.528455 0.477897 3.198291 0.0024
POSGOV(-1) -0.771388 0.544459 -1.416799 0.1629
POSGOV(-2) 0.891111 0.545151 1.634612 0.1085
NEGGOV** 1.631021 0.730747 2.231992 0.0302
NEGGOV(-1) -0.332542 0.767896 -0.433056 0.6669
NEGGOV(-2)* -1.203266 0.678773 -1.772708 0.0825
POSM2 0.056594 0.098118 0.576799 0.5667
POSM2(-1) -0.133000 0.125370 -1.060860 0.2940
POSM2(-2) -0.083607 0.129890 -0.643675 0.5228
NEGM2 -0.023144 0.168748 -0.137153 0.8915
NEGM2(-1) -0.040596 0.253705 -0.160013 0.8735
NEGM2(-2) 0.012015 0.186033 0.064585 0.9488
POSEXR 15.66077 18.94626 0.826589 0.4125
POSEXR(-1) -15.69952 18.63422 -0.842510 0.4036
POSEXR(-2) 5.700833 11.82296 0.482183 0.6318
NEGEXR -5.956725 10.36798 -0.574531 0.5682
NEGEXR(-1) 15.01344 11.49647 1.305917 0.1977
NEGEXR(-2) -14.10922 13.48723 -1.046117 0.3006
R-squared 0.497419     Mean dependent var 1052.827
Adjusted R-squared 0.312797     S.D. dependent var 2158.905
S.E. of regression 1789.682     Akaike info criterion 18.04860
Sum squared resid 1.57E+08     Schwarz criterion 18.66876
Log likelihood -594.6524     F-statistic 2.694263
Durbin-Watson stat 2.146201     Prob(F-statistic) 0.003088
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Asymmetric Test 
Wald Test: Positive Government Expenditure Shock 
Equation:  
Null Hypothesis: C(2)=0 
 C(3)=0 
 C(4)=0 
F-statistic 5.548035  Probability 0.002330
Chi-square 16.64410  Probability 0.000836
 
Wald Test: Negative Government Expenditure Shock 
Equation:  
Null Hypothesis: C(5)=0 
 C(6)=0 
 C(7)=0 
F-statistic 3.451525  Probability 0.023467
Chi-square 10.35457  Probability 0.015781
 
Wald Test: Positive Government Expenditure Shock 
Equation:  
Null Hypothesis: C(2)+C(3)+C(4)=0 
F-statistic 5.417620  Probability 0.024108
Chi-square 5.417620  Probability 0.019935
 
Wald Test: Negative Government Expenditure Shock 
Equation:  
Null Hypothesis: C(5)+C(6)+C(7)=0 
F-statistic 0.009355  Probability 0.923342
Chi-square 0.009355  Probability 0.922948
 
Wald Test: Asymmetric Test of Government Expenditure 
Equation:  
Null Hypothesis: C(2)+C(3)+C(4)=-(C(5)+C(6)+C(7)) 
F-statistic 2.291285  Probability 0.136526
Chi-square 2.291285  Probability 0.130102
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Table VI: Reaction of Output to Positive and Negative Shock With 2 Lags (Excluding 
Exchange Rate Variable)  
 
Dependent Variable: D(GDP,1) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/08/02   Time: 12:07 
Sample(adjusted): 1980:3 1997:2 
Included observations: 68 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 339.9465 430.4526 0.789742 0.4331
POSGOV 1.507933 0.468447 3.219007 0.0022
POSGOV(-1) -0.873875 0.525375 -1.663334 0.1019
POSGOV(-2) 1.054133 0.521336 2.021984 0.0481
NEGGOV 1.669524 0.697462 2.393713 0.0201
NEGGOV(-1) -0.428227 0.758576 -0.564514 0.5747
NEGGOV(-2) -1.033062 0.629263 -1.641701 0.1064
POSM2 0.071128 0.093519 0.760572 0.4502
POSM2(-1) -0.164248 0.119250 -1.377342 0.1740
POSM2(-2) -0.062471 0.125750 -0.496784 0.6213
NEGM2 0.004146 0.167212 0.024793 0.9803
NEGM2(-1) -0.080042 0.250418 -0.319632 0.7505
NEGM2(-2) 0.012037 0.184295 0.065315 0.9482
R-squared 0.441433     Mean dependent var 1052.827
Adjusted R-squared 0.319564     S.D. dependent var 2158.905
S.E. of regression 1780.850     Akaike info criterion 17.97775
Sum squared resid 1.74E+08     Schwarz criterion 18.40207
Log likelihood -598.2434     F-statistic 3.622184
Durbin-Watson stat 2.164109     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000514
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Asymmetric Test  
Wald Test: Positive Government Expenditure Shock 
Equation 
Null Hypothesis: C(2)=C(4) 
 C(3)=C(4) 
F-statistic 5.192542  Probability 0.008596
Chi-square 10.38508  Probability 0.005558
 
Wald Test: Negative Government Expenditure Shock 
Equation:  
Null Hypothesis: C(5)=C(7) 
 C(6)=C(7) 
F-statistic 4.924187  Probability 0.010783
Chi-square 9.848374  Probability 0.007269
 
Wald Test: Positive Government Expenditure Shock 
Equation:  
Null Hypothesis: C(2)+C(3)+C(4)=0 
F-statistic 6.864051  Probability 0.011346
Chi-square 6.864051  Probability 0.008795
 
Wald Test: Negative Government Expenditure Shock 
Equation:  
Null Hypothesis: C(5)+C(6)+C(7)=0 
F-statistic 0.052877  Probability 0.818984
Chi-square 0.052877  Probability 0.818131
 
Wald Test: Asymmetric Test For Government Expenditure 
Equation: EQ01 
Null Hypothesis: C(2)+C(3)+C(4)=-(C(5)+C(6)+C(7)) 
F-statistic 3.079283  Probability 0.084865
Chi-square 3.079283  Probability 0.079295
 
Wald Test: Positive Money Supply Shock  
Equation:  
Null Hypothesis: C(8)=C(10) 
 C(9)=C(10) 
F-statistic 0.792226  Probability 0.457935
Chi-square 1.584451  Probability 0.452836
 
Wald Test: Negative Money Supply Shock  
Equation:  
Null Hypothesis: C(11)=C(13) 
 C(12)=C(13) 
F-statistic 0.026172  Probability 0.974180
Chi-square 0.052344  Probability 0.974167
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Table VII: Inflation Rate Estimation: Without Defining Positive and Negative Shock 
(Log Form) 
 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(CPI),1) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/25/02   Time: 09:41 
Sample(adjusted): 1980:2 1997:2 
Included observations: 69 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.017125 0.002575 6.650674 0.0000
D(LOG(GOVN),1) -0.008884 0.006438 -1.379914 0.1724
D(LOG(M2),1) -0.029130 0.041717 -0.698285 0.4875
D(LOG(EXRATE),1) 0.086431 0.024408 3.541046 0.0007
D(LOG(WOILP),1) 0.112309 0.012326 9.111217 0.0000
R-squared 0.593392     Mean dependent var 0.020737
Adjusted R-squared 0.567979     S.D. dependent var 0.015378
S.E. of regression 0.010107     Akaike info criterion -6.281376
Sum squared resid 0.006538     Schwarz criterion -6.119484
Log likelihood 221.7075     F-statistic 23.34992
Durbin-Watson stat 2.063679     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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 Table VIII: Inflation Estimation: Positive and Negative Shock Without Lag  
 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(CPI),1) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/25/02   Time: 09:44 
Sample(adjusted): 1980:2 1997:2 
Included observations: 69 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.026509 0.006129 4.324951 0.0001
POSGOV 5.39E-06 3.28E-06 1.642714 0.1056
NEGGOV 2.50E-06 4.10E-06 0.610286 0.5439
POSM2 -1.55E-07 5.13E-07 -0.302372 0.7634
NEGM2 3.71E-07 7.85E-07 0.472597 0.6382
POSEXR 6.03E-05 4.68E-05 1.287238 0.2029
NEGEXR -2.15E-05 4.64E-05 -0.462978 0.6450
WOILP -4.24E-05 2.77E-05 -1.530998 0.1309
R-squared 0.107999     Mean dependent var 0.020737
Adjusted R-squared 0.005638     S.D. dependent var 0.015378
S.E. of regression 0.015334     Akaike info criterion -5.408802
Sum squared resid 0.014344     Schwarz criterion -5.149775
Log likelihood 194.6037     F-statistic 1.055080
Durbin-Watson stat 2.200933     Prob(F-statistic) 0.403204
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 Table IX: Inflation Reaction to Positive and Negative Shock With 2 Lags 
 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(CPI),1) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/25/02   Time: 09:47 
Sample(adjusted): 1980:3 1997:2 
Included observations: 68 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.019659 0.004180 4.703001 0.0000
POSGOV 1.53E-06 2.81E-06 0.544787 0.5885
POSGOV(-1) 2.51E-06 2.96E-06 0.849231 0.4002
POSGOV(-2) -2.38E-06 2.90E-06 -0.818907 0.4171
NEGGOV 4.44E-06 3.70E-06 1.202624 0.2353
NEGGOV(-1) 2.26E-07 3.97E-06 0.056809 0.9549
NEGGOV(-2) 3.62E-06 3.83E-06 0.942861 0.3507
POSM2 1.15E-07 5.03E-07 0.228576 0.8202
POSM2(-1) 1.40E-07 6.15E-07 0.227400 0.8211
POSM2(-2) -8.73E-07 6.41E-07 -1.362166 0.1798
NEGM2 -5.98E-08 8.43E-07 -0.070938 0.9438
NEGM2(-1) 4.96E-08 1.22E-06 0.040690 0.9677
NEGM2(-2) 6.46E-07 9.06E-07 0.713608 0.4791
POSEXR 7.96E-05 9.16E-05 0.869684 0.3890
POSEXR(-1) -7.68E-05 8.92E-05 -0.860591 0.3939
POSEXR(-2) 3.87E-05 5.71E-05 0.678119 0.5011
NEGEXR -0.000119 5.09E-05 -2.336119 0.0239
NEGEXR(-1) 0.000124 5.66E-05 2.197651 0.0330
NEGEXR(-2) 8.68E-06 6.60E-05 0.131621 0.8959
WOILP 0.000635 7.60E-05 8.364633 0.0000
WOILP(-1) -0.000721 0.000101 -7.136859 0.0000
WOILP(-2) 4.76E-05 7.46E-05 0.638542 0.5263
R-squared 0.716840     Mean dependent var 0.019790
Adjusted R-squared 0.587571     S.D. dependent var 0.013314
S.E. of regression 0.008550     Akaike info criterion -6.429508
Sum squared resid 0.003363     Schwarz criterion -5.711432
Log likelihood 240.6033     F-statistic 5.545351
Durbin-Watson stat 2.742616     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001
 
  
